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SANELLI v. GLENVIEW STATE BANK.* THE
ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ENACTS
RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION TO SAVE THE
BANKING INDUSTRY -

THE ILLINOIS

SUPREME COURT STAYS OUT OF THE WAY
Historically, authorities have viewed retroactive legislation1 as
that which impairs or extinguishes rights available under pre-existing law.2 Such legislation is considered constitutionally vulnerable
* 483 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. 1985).
1. Retroactive legislation is that which gives a different legal effect to preenactment conduct than it would have had if the legislation had never been passed. Hochman, The Supreme Court and The Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73
HARv. L. REV. 692 (1960). When a law is applied retroactively it is, in effect, reaching
back in time to affect transactions or occurrences arising prior to the statute's effective date. See, e.g., Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Bd. of Comm's., 285 U.S. 338 (1922);
de Rodulfa v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240, 1247-53 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
949 (1972). A definition of retroactivity, however, is easier to state than it is to apply.
A distinction between prospective and retroactive legislation cannot always be clearly
drawn. 2 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.01 at 245 (4th ed.
1973). Legislation can be, and often is, considered both. Id. Attempting to classify
legislation as one or the other, then, may result in a value judgment concerning the
interpretation or validty of the statute under consideration, based upon other
grounds. Id. For an in depth discussion of retroactive legislation, see generally C.
SANDS at §§ 41.01-41.22; J. SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTERESTS
IN LAND (1953); W. WADE, A TREATISE ON THE OPERATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF
RETROACTIVE LAWS (1880). For the historical background of retroactive legislation, see
generally Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation:A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence, 20 MINN. L. REV. 775 (1936).
2. There are three distinct ideas underlying the concept of retroactivity: 1) undoing the effects of laws under which existing rights were maintained; 2) undoing of
such laws by reason of a past event upon which prospective duties are made to depend; and 3) undoing of laws by reason of a past event upon which prospective and
retroactive duties are made to depend. Smith, RetroactiveLaws and Vested Rights, 5
TEX. L. REV. 231, 232-33 (1927) (pt. I). However, this distinction may be more confusing than useful. Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51
Nw. UL. REV. 540, 544 n.22 (1956). Regardless of the distinction, "legal effects of past
acts are changed and the rights and duties which depend on such acts are reordered."
Id.
Retroactive legislation, in and of itself, has encountered much opposition. One of
the reasons that retroactive laws have encountered opposition is that they disturb
"the comfortable feeling men indulge that whatever the future may hold in store, the
past, at least, is secured." Smith, Retroactive Law and Vested Rights, 6 TEx. L. REV.
409, 418 (1928) (pt. II). One of the most basic reasons retroactive legislation is held
suspect is because "a person should be able to plan his conduct with reasonable certainty of the legal consequences." Hochman, supra note 1, at 692. Stability, especially
with respect to pre-existing law, is expected not only in the application of laws to
past transactions, but also, in the setting of standards to govern future conduct. Id. at
692-93. Another reason why retroactive legislation is suspect is because it may be
enacted with the knowledge of the parties who will benefit from its passage. Id. at
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because it reaches into the past and changes the legal ramifications
of completed events.3 A statute is not rendered unconstitutional per
se, however, merely because it is retroactive.4 When a court is faced
with a challenge to retroactive legislation, it must carefully balance
and discriminate between reasons for and against a finding of constitutionality.5 In Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank,6 the Illinois Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a retroactivity provision
contained in legislation,7 which was enacted in response to a prior
decision of the court,8 violated the Illinois separation of powers doctrine.9 Finding that the province of the Illinois judiciary had not
been invaded, the court held that the retroactivity provision of the
land trust legislation"0 did not violate the Illinois separation of powers doctrine."l
In 1968, Alfred Sanelli ("Sanelli") and his wife entered into an
Illinois land trust agreement 12 with Glenview State Bank
693. For additional commentary on retroactive legislation, see generally C. SANDS,
supra note 1, at § 41.02; W. WADE, supra note 1, at 3; Greenblatt, supra, at 540-50;
Hochman, supra note 1, at 693-97; Smead, supra note 1, at 775; Smith (pts. I & II),
supra.
3. The terms retrospective and retroactive describe acts which operate on transactions which have occurred or rights and obligations which existed before passage of
the act. C. SANDS, supra note 1, at § 41.01. Once again, this concept is stated in various verbal formulations. One formulation holds that it was the legislature's intent to
design a statute that applies to existing interests. J. SCURLOCK, supra note 2, at 1.
Another holds that retroactive statutes reach "back to attach new legal rights and
duties to already completed transactions." Hochman, supra note 1, at 692. Yet another maintains that a statute is retroactive "if it assumes to give effect to a past
event, in order to create a present right or duty." Smith (pt. I), supra note 2, at 232.
4. Smith (pt. II), supra note 2, at 421. Smith stated that "[b]etween lawful and
unlawful there is no absolute opposition; there is only a relative difference. . .all depends upon the measure and there is no absolute measure." Smith (pt. I), supra note
2, at 421 (quoting from Kar Kunov, Theory of Law, 4 Modern Legal Philosophy Series 73, 74).
5. Smith (pt. II), supra note 2, at 431. Smith asserts that whatever rule is formulated, the method to be pursued is not the unerring pursuit of a fixed legal principle to an inevitable conclusion. Rather, it is the method of intelligently balancing and
discriminating between reasons for and against. When lawyers have a precedent to
follow, it is proper that they follow it. Id.
6. 483 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. 1985).
7. Public Act. No. 82-891. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, §§ 81-84 (1983).
8. See Home Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. of Chicago v. Zarkin, 89 Ill. 2d
232, 432 N.E.2d 841 (1982).
9. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 227-28.
10. Public Act 82-891. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch.148, §§ 81-84 (1983).
11. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 234.
12. Id. at 227. The Illinois land trust has become a "unique creation of the Illinois bar. . . ." People v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 75 Ill. 2d 479, 487, 389 N.E.2d
540, 543 (1979). Land trusts have been defined as "revocable inter vivos trusts, the
corpus of which usually consist solely of real estate." Haswell and Levine, The Illinois
Land Trust: A Fictional Best Seller, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 277, 278 (1984). Accord
Kessler, Merci, and Lochner, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 101 Ill. App. 3d 502,
428 N.E.2d 608 (1981) (a trustee can be an agent of the beneficiary where the beneficiary's signature on a contract requiring arbitration could be binding on the beneficiary; however, the beneficiary's direction to the trustee to execute a contract is not,
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("Bank"). 3 Under this agreement, the Bank held title to the land in
trust for the benefit of the Sanellis. 14 Ten years later, the Sanellis
assigned their beneficial interest" in the trust property to the Bank
as security for a loan.16 The Bank, therefore, held the land both as
trustee and as secured creditor.'" The Sanelli's subsequently defaulted on the loan and in December, 1981, the Bank purchased the
beneficial interest in the trust property at a public sale.'"
in and of itself, sufficient to create an agency). Contra H. KENOE, KENOE ON LAND
TRUSTS § 1.22, at 18 (1981 and Supp. 1983) (when a trustee is acting under the direction of a beneficiary, he is not acting as an agent; rather, he is acting as a principal for
himself at the direction of the beneficiary) (emphasis added). In contrast to a conventional trust, the Illinois land trust gives the beneficiary full and complete control over
the management, use, and disposition of the property. Id. During the life of the land
trust, the trustee can act only upon the direction of the beneficiary. Id. Unlike the
conventional trust, the beneficiary of a land trust is the true owner of the property.
Id. at 279. The trustee of the land trust is actually the equivalent of an agent for the
beneficiary, because the trustee can legally bind the beneficiary when, the trustee acts
at the direction of the beneficiary. Id.
The interest of a land trust beneficiary is described in the trust documents as
personal property. Haswell and Levine, supra, at 283. Both the legal and equitable
title to the real estate lie with the trustee. Id. Illinois courts continually give effect to
these representations. Id. In conventional trusts, where the corpus is real estate, the
beneficiaries' interests are only considered personal property if their interests are limited to the earnings and proceeds of sale and if the trustees retain effective control
over the property. Id. Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 82(a) (1983): 'land trust' means
any express agreement or arrangement whereof a use, confidence or trust is declared
of any land, or of any charge upon land, for the use or benefit of any beneficiary,
under which the title to real property, both legal and equitable, is held by a trustee,
subject only to the execution of the trust, which may be enforced by the beneficiaries
who have the exclusive right to manage and control the real estate, to have possession
thereof, to receive the net proceeds from the rental, sale, hypothecation or other disposition thereof, and under which the interest of the beneficiary is personal property
only. Id.
For a general discussion of Illinois land trusts, see H. KENOE, KENOE ON LAND
TRUSTS (1981 and Supp. 1983); Hawell and Levine, The Illinois Land Trust: A Fictional Best Seller, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 277 (1984).
13. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 227.
14. Id. at 228.
15. Id. Compare Black's Law Dictionary's definition of a beneficial interest as
the "[p]rofit benefit, or advantage resulting from a contract, or the ownership of an
estate as distinct from the legal ownership or control," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 142
(5th ed. 1979), with a definition in the land trust context:
In the typical managed trust arrangement, legal title in the corpus is vested in
the trustee and the beneficiaries hold equitable title in the corpus. Such is not
the case with the land trust. In a land trust, the trustee holds both legal and
equitable title to the real estate. The beneficiaries of the trust have only a
personal property interest in the trust rather than an equitable interest in the
real estate.

Lindberg, Assignments of Beneficial Interests in Illinois Land Trusts as Security for
a Debt,
16.
17.
18.

70 ILL. B.J. 576 (1982).
Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 228.
Id.
Id. A public sale is a sale "made in pursuance of a notice, by auction or

sheriff."

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1201 (5th ed. 1979).

It should be noted that Glenview State Bank was not only the highest bidder at
the public sale; but, it was also the only bidder. Thus, the Bank purchased the Sanellis' property interest and applied the proceeds to the Sanellis' outstanding loan bal-
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In January, 1982, the Illinois Supreme Court in Home Federal
Savings and Loan v. Zarkin " held that Illinois land trustees are
subject to the fiduciary duties that the law imposes in all traditional
trust relationships.2 Further, the Zarkin court found that a bankland trustee may take an assignment of the beneficial interest as
security for a loan.21 The burden is on the fiduciary, however, to
prove that the transaction was fair.2 In Zarkin, the court held that
the bank-land trustee breached its duty of loyalty to the land trust
beneficiaries when it purchased the trust property for its own advantage.28 Zarkin was remanded to allow the bank-land trustee to
show that its purchase was "fair."2" Once proven, the bank, under
Zarkin, would be allowed to recover on its claim of default.2 5 Three
months after Zarkin was decided, the Sanellis filed suit2 6 against the
ance. Brief for Appellee at 2, Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, 483 N.E.2d 226 (Ill.
1985).
19. Home Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. of Chicago v. Zarkin, 89 111.2d 232,
432 N.E.2d 841 (1982). The Zarkins entered into an Illinois land trust agreement with
Devon National Bank. Id. at 236, 432 N.E.2d at 844. At the Zarkin's direction, the
bank executed a first mortgage on the trust property with Home Federal Savings and
Loan. Id. Several years later, the Zarkins ran into financial difficulty, and borrowed
$14,000 from the bank. Id. Unable to repay the loan as it came due, the Zarkins
assigned their beneficial interest in the trust property to the bank to secure repayment of the loan. Id. The bank was the secured creditor and trustee.
Home Federal then sued to foreclose the mortgage. Id. The property was sold at
a Sheriff's sale, and Home Federal bid the amount it had received in the judgment of
foreclosure. Id. During the redemption period, the bank, without notifying the
Zarkins, purchased the certificate of sale from Home Federal. Id. The Zarkins sued
the bank alleging the bank breached its fiduciary duty as trustee. Id. The Illinois
Supreme Court held that land trusts are to be treated no differently than any other
trust. Id. at 239, 432 N.E.2d at 845. The decision was rendered in January of 1982.
The case was remanded on grounds not relevant to Sanelli.
20. Id. A traditional trust fiduciary's relation has been defined as follows:
Out of such a relation, the law raises the rule that neither party may exert
influence or pressure upon the other, take selfish advantage of his trust, or deal
with the subject matter of the trust in such a way as to benefit himself or
prejudice the other except in the exercise of the utmost good faith and with
knowledge and consent of that other, business shrewdness, hard bargaining,
and astuteness to take advantage of the forgetfulness or negligence of another
being totally prohibited as between persons standing in such a relation to each
other.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 754 (5th

ed.

1979). But see H. KENO,

KENOE ON LAND

TRuSTS § 1.3 at 7 (1981 and Supp. 1983) (the author recognizes that a distinctive
feature of a land trust is that "[tihe trustee has no duties or powers other than to
convey, mortgage or deal with the real estate as directed by the beneficiaries").
21. Home Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., 89 Ill. 2d at 901, 432 N.E.2d at 845
(1982).
22. Id. at 902, 432 N.E.2d at 846.
23. Id. at 904, 432 N.E.2d at 848.
24. Id. at 905, 432 N.E.2d at 849.

25. Id.
26. Actually, Sanelli filed his complaint against approximately 185 banks and
savings and loan associations. All defendants except Glenview State Bank were dismissed on various procedural grounds. Brief of Appellee at 1, Sanelli v. Glenview
State Bank, 483 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. 1985).
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Bank alleging that the Bank had breached its fiduciary duty when it
purchased their beneficial interest in the trust.2" The Sanellis' theory of recovery was based on Zarkin2 s
In August, 1982, the Illinois legislature passed an "Act in relation to land trusts and the power and authority of trustees of land
trusts to deal with trust property" (the "Act").2" The Act was passed
in response to the Zarkin court's interpretation of an accepted practice in the banking industry.30 In Illinois, it is well established that a
bank can be both a land trustee and a secured creditor in a loan
transaction, holding the trust property as collateral."1 The Act codified this practice and expressly permits a land trustee to become a
secured creditor without breaching its fiduciary duties.3 " The Bank
27. Home Federal Savings and Loan v. Zarkin, 89 Ill. 2d 232, 432 N.E.2d 841
(1982).
28. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 227.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 81 (1983). The relevant language of the Act reads
as follows:
81. Legislative Findings - Purpose
1. (a) The General Assembly finds:
(4) *** [Bleneficiaries will frequently select a financial institution as trustee
simply because that institution will be asked by the beneficiaries to extend
credit to the trust or to the beneficiaries secured by their interest in the trust.
(5) Recently, this accepted practice of a creditor lending money to itself as
trustee or to the beneficiaries upon the security of an interest in the land trust
of which it is trustee, has been scrutinized by the Illinois Supreme Court.
(b) It is the purpose of this act to codify the accepted practice of creditorlending to the trustee of a land trust or the beneficiaries thereof upon the security of trust property or their interest in the trust, even though the creditor
and the trustee are the same, and to foster and encourage the availability of
financing for owners and developers of real estate.
82. Trustee as creditor - Effect - Definitions
2. If a debt is secured by a security interest in a beneficial interest in a
land trust or by a mortgage on land trust property, neither the validity or enforceability of the debt, security interest or mortgage, nor the rights, remedies,
powers and duties of the creditor with respect to the debt or the security shall
be affected by the fact that the creditor and the trustee are the same person,
and the creditor may extend credit, obtain such security interest or mortgage,
and acquire and deal with the property comprising the security as though the
creditor were not the trustee.
83. Breach of fiduciary duty
3. The fact that a trustee of a land trust is or becomes a secured or unsecured creditor of the land trust, the beneficiaries of the land trust, or a third
party whose debt to such creditor is guaranteed by a beneficiary of the land
trust, shall not be a breach of, and shall not be deemed evidence of a breach of
any fiduciary duty owed by said trustee to the beneficiaries.
84. Application of Act
4. This Act applies to all security interests in a beneficial interest in land
trust and all mortgages on land trust property and to all debts secured
thereby, whether arising before, on, or after the effective date of this Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, §§ 81-84 (1983) (emphasis added).
30. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 81 (1983).
31. Id. § 82.
32. Id.
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moved to dismiss the Sanellis' complaint on the ground that the Act
barred their claim.33 The lower court dismissed their claim and
granted a direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court."
In its first consideration of Sanelli, the Illinois Supreme Court
unanimously concluded that the Act was unconstitutional because it
violated the Illinois separation of powers doctrine.3 5 The court construed the retroactivity provision as a legislative attempt to reverse
the Zarkin decision. 8 Upon rehearing, however, the court considered the Bank's claim that the legislature did not intend to nullify
Zarkin when it passed the Act.37 The issue presented for review was
whether the retroactivity provision of the Act, as it applied to the
dispute between Sanelli and the Bank, violated the Illinois separation of powers doctrine.39 In a four to three decision, the Sanelli
court held that the Act did not constitute an invasion of the judicial
province.39 The court found that the act only changed the "effect" of
Zarkin and did not represent an attempt to overturn that decision. 0
Accordingly, the court held that the Act did not violate the Illinois
1
separation of powers doctrine.4

The court began its analysis with the observation that retroactive legislation is not unconstitutional per se.' 2 The court recognized
that determining the validity of this type of legislation depended
upon the scope of the separation of powers doctrine. 4' The applica33. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 235.
34. Id. at 226. Sanelli's direct appeal was allowed pursuant to Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 302(b) which provides that:
After the filing of the notice of appeal to the Appellate Court in a case in
which the public interest requires prompt adjudication by the Supreme Court,
the Supreme Court or a justice thereof may order that the appeal be taken
directly to it.... From that point the case shall proceed in all respects though
the appeal had been taken directly to the Supreme Court.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 302(b) (1983).
35. Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank, No. 57935, slip op. (Ill. April 27, 1984),
rev'd, 483 N.E.2d at 226 (1985). The unpublished opinion is available at The John
Marshall Law Review Office.
36.

Id.

37. Id. at 229.
38. Id. at 226-39. The other issue presented for review was whether the retroactivity provision violated the prohibition against laws which impair the obligations of
contracts, or the due process clause. Id. at 226. For the court holding see infra note
57.
39. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 238-39.
40.

Id.

41. Id.
42. Id. at 229. See Smith (pts. I & II), supra note 2.
43. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 229. See In re Barker's Estate, 63 Ill. 2d 113, 345
N.E.2d 484 (1976) (true meaning of doctrine: whole power of two or more branches
shall not be lodged in the same hands); City of Waukegan v. Pollution Control Bd.,
57 Il1. 2d 170, 311 N.E.2d 146 (1974) (same principle); Hill v. Relyea, 34 Ill. 2d 552,
216 N.E.2d 795 (1966) (same principle and definition of "hands," i.e., whether one or
many). See also Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 412 Ill. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952) (each
department performs duties assigned to it and exercises no powers properly belonging
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tion of the doctrine to retroactive legislation is necessary because
there is an express separation of powers provision in the Illinois

Constitution. 44 The court also observed that prior case law interpreted the separation of powers doctrine to invalidate legislation
which constitutes an invasion of the judiciary's province. 45 The court
concluded that the separation of powers doctrine should be narrowly
applied. 4" Accordingly, the court held that the legislature may enact
retroactive legislation that changes the "effect" of prior decisions in
pending or future cases. 4' The legislature may enact this form of retroactive legislation regardless of whether the circumstances which
gave rise to the
litigation accrued before, on, or after the statute's
48
effective date.
The Sanelli court noted the general rule that a statute may not
change a prior decision of a reviewing court. 4 Statutes may only,
to either of the other two); People ex rel. Bernat v. Bicek, 405 Ill. 510, 91 N.E.2d 588
(1950) (same principle). But see Stamp v. C.I.R., 579 F. Supp. 168 (1984) (separation
of powers is not enforceable independently of a constitutional provision).
44. The Illinois Constitution provides: "The legislative, executive and judicial
branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another." ILL. CONST. art. II, cl.1.

45. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 230. See Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382
(1978). The application of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act to
pending actions and actions commenced prior to its effective date did not unconstitutionally prevent a trial court from adjudicating rights. Id. See also Worley v. Idleman,
285 Ill. 214, 220, 120 N.E.2d 472, 475 (1918) (passing a curative act does not constitute an invasion of the province of the judiciary or set aside any judgment or decree
of the court); W. WADE, supra note 1, at 36 (citing Cooley's Const. Lim. 113, 114 (the
legislature cannot act upon past controversies and reverse a decision which the
courts, "in their exercise of undoubted authority," have rendered)).
46. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 229.
47. Id. at 229-30. The court explicitly provides that "[Tihe General Assembly
may enact retroactive legislation which changes the effect of a prior decision of a
reviewing court with respect to others whose circumstances are similar but whose
rights have been finally decided." Id.
48. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 229.
49. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801).
If subsequent to a judgment and before a decision of a reviewing court, a new law
intervenes and changes the then governing law, the new law must be obeyed. Id.;
Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1948). The Portal-to-Portal Act,
which took away the right to recover overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, did not in any manner affect adjudications already made. Id. In a case involving
a judgment against the United States for a violation of a consent decree requiring the
government to provide resources to the Board for Chicago's desegregation plan, the
court held no legislative change in the law can retroactively effect a judicial determination brought to a final judgment prior to that change. United States v. Board of
Education of Chicago, 580 F. Supp. 132, vacated, 744 F.2d 1300 (1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2358 (1985); Schlenz v. Castle, 84 Ill. 2d 196, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981) (subsequent to an Illinois Supreme Court's decision that publication dates in an assessment statute were mandatory, the legislature enacted legislation retroactively validating untimely assessments which did not violate the separation of powers doctrine
because it did not reflect a construction contrary to the decision), appeal dismissed,
454 U.S. 804 (1981). In upholding the validity of the retroactive application of the
Messages Tax Act, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that what the legislature could
not do is constitutionally overrule a decision of the court when giving a statute retro-
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however, change the effect of a prior decision with respect to those
parties whose rights have yet to be fully adjudicated.60 The court
stressed that legislation which is otherwise valid may be applied to
transactions or events which occurred prior to the statute's effective
date. "
The Sanelli court also stressed that its holding applied regardless of whether the retroactive legislation was enacted in response to
a court's interpretation of a statute"2 or the common law. 3 An inactive effect. General Telephone Co. of Ill. v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 2d 363, 469 N.E.2d
1067 (1984). See also In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill. 2d 190, 443 N.E.2d 541 (1982) (a
statute giving a court discretion to enter judgments of dissolution of marriage while
reserving other issues not given retroactive effect to reverse decisions that invalidated
judgments of dissolutions). A statute amending the Cannabis Control Act was held to
retroactively overrule a decision of a reviewing court. Roth v. Yackley, 77 Il1. 2d 423,
396 N.E.2d 520 (1979). The court held that the General Assembly cannot constitutionally overrule a decision of the Illinois Supreme Court through the retroactive application of legislation. Id. In another decision, the Illinois Supreme Court found the
retroactivity provision of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act constitutional: "[it] applies to all pending actions and proceedings commenced prior to
its effective date with respect to issues on which a judgment has not been entered."
Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71111. 2d 563, 570, 376 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (1978); People ex
rel., Coen v. Henry, 301 Ill. 51, 133 N.E. 636 (1921) (entering an order is a judicial
function and legislature has the function of changing laws; courts will dispose of cases
under the law in force at the time the court's judgment is rendered); Worley v. Idleman, 285 Ill.
214, 120 N.E. 472 (1918). Until an adjudication of rights between the
taxpayers and the town had been made, the legislature had the right to enact curative
legislation to validate what would otherwise be an invalid tax assessment. Id.; Steger
v. Traveling Men's Building & Loan Ass'n, 208 Ill. 236, 70 N.E. 236 (1904) (courts
giving legal effect to a statute providing for the written execution of deeds, mortgages,
etc., because the legislation did not purport to settle disputes or controversies).
50. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 229. The court specifically stated: "[w]hat the General Assembly may not do is pass a statute in an attempt to change the result of a
decision which has been finally decided as between the parties to that case." Id. The
court cited to the Roth court's finding that "the General Assembly cannot constitutionally overrule a decision of this court by declaring that an amendatory act applies
retroactively to cases decided before its effective date." Id. It also cited to the Cohn
court's finding that the legislature "attempt to attribute to a statute, at the time of
the reviewing court's opinion and attempts to validate all judgments. . .that were
entered prior to the effective date of the amendment. . . .Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at
232-33. See also Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948) (no
violation of the separation of powers because the regulatory legislation did not attempt to change decisions in any way; "It left valid final judgments."). See also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., 258 U.S. 13 (1922)
(a valid withholding of power [i.e., the state could legislate] before "conditions" were
"established and adjudicated, and this not preliminary or dependent, but [a] final
and unreviewable determination").
51. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 233. The court provided that "the legislature had the
authority to change the law for future cases arising from facts existing prior to the
effective date of the legislation which made the change." Id.
52. Id. at 230. See, e.g., General Telephone Co., of Ill. v. Johnson, 103 Ill.
2d
363, 469 N.E.2d 1067 (1984) (retroactive legislation involving valid amendment to the
Message Tax Act); In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill.
2d 190, 443 N.E.2d 541 (1982)
(statute amending the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act); Schlenz v.
Castle, 84 Ill. 2d 196, 417 N.E.2d 1336 (1981) (retroactive legislation amending the
requirements set out for tax assessment publication dates in the Revenue Act of
1939), appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 804 (1981); Roth v. Yackley, 77 Ill. 2d 423, 396
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fringement of the judiciary's province can only occur when the legislative enactment attempts to reverse a reviewing court's decision 5 '
or when it explicitly construes a statute's meaning contrary to a reviewing court's construction in the context of a case that has already
been decided."s The court reasoned that because Sanelli's rights had
yet to be fully adjudicated when the Act became effective, and because the Act was passed to change the effect of Zarkin and not the
decision itself, the retroactive application of the Act to the dispute
between Sanelli and the Bank was constitutionally valid.56 The retroactive application of the law did not constitute an invasion of the
judicial province and, therefore, did not violate the Illinois separa57
tion of powers doctrine.
The Sanelli court was justified in holding that the retroactivity
N.E.2d 520 (1979) (statute involving amendment to the Cannabis Control Act); People v. Holmstrom, 8 Ill. 2d 401, 134 N.E.2d 246 (1956) (the statute in question curing
the irregularities of publication lists in the Revenue Act of 1939).
53. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 230. See, e.g., Chevron Chemical Co. v. Superior
Court, 131 Ariz. 432, 641 P.2d 1275 (1982) (a retroactively applied statute allowing an
injured employee a third-party claim to be reassigned to the third-party after he had
assigned it to his employer); Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 173
N.W.2d 353 (1969) (a statute replacing the law of contributory negligence with comparative negligence constitutionally applied retroactively).
54. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 231-32.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 233-34.
57. Id. Finding the separation of powers doctrine intact, the court addressed
the issue regarding the prohibition of laws that impair contracts provision and the
due process clause. Id. The court cited Greenblatt, to justify its considering the two
as one issue:
Although it has been suggested that the standards maybe more rigid under the
contract clause than under the due process clause, and thus that contract
rights may be better protected against retroactive state legislation than other
rights, it is probable that since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment the
former clause has been largely absorbed by the latter.
Id. (quoting Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51
Nw. U. L. REV. 540, 543-44 (1956)). The court recognized that balancing the various
interests involved would result in an accurate determination of whether this retroactive legislation violated the contract clause. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 234-39. The interests that the court balanced were those of society in "foster[ing] and encourag[ing]
the availability of financing for owners and developers of real estate." Id. at 235, and
of the individuals' rights, id. at 234, arising out of Zarkin. The court found Sanelli's
rights to be minimal at best: the possibility that he relied on Zarkin did not appear
likely to the court as the court had never given an indication that "Zarkin-type"
transactions would be condemned. Id. at 235-37. Sanelli never alleged factors to be
considered in applying the appropriate balancing test set out in General Telephone
Co. of Ill. v. Johnson, 103 Ill. 2d 363, 378-79, 469 N.E.2d 1067, 1081 (1984). Sanelli,
483 N.E.2d at 237. The court then considered the rights Sanelli might have had under
Zarkin and concluded that "it would not be unfair to apply the legislative enactment
retroactively so as to impair whatever rights Sanelli may have acquired." Id. The
court also found that any impairment that may have occurred due to the acts passage
was a reasonable exercise of legislature's authority to provide for the public welfare
and to protect society's interest. Id. at 236-37. For an academic analysis of the test
that the court applied to the second issue, see Hochman, The Supreme Court and
the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HAav. L. REV. 692 (1960).
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provision of the Act did not violate the Illinois separation of powers
doctrine. Rehearing the constitutionality issue, the court accurately
applied a narrow construction of the doctrine. This narrow construction allowed the court to avoid the potential misapplication of the
court's final decision in Zarkin. The court's analysis highlighted the
differences between a reversal and a clarification of a final judgment.
Moreover, the court's holding can be justified on the ground that it
implicitly recognized the legislature's intent to alleviate the banking
industry's concern that Zarkin might be misapplied.
Prior case law has consistently affirmed the principle that a legislative enactment may change the effect of a prior decision if the
final result among the parties to that decision is not affected."6
When the Sanelli court was originally faced with the dispute over
the validity of the Act's retroactivity provision,5 9 the court based its
decision on a broad application of the separation of powers doctrine.60 Consequently, the court failed to give effect to the principle
that retroactive legislation may only be applied to cases in which a
final judgment has yet to be rendered.61 Initially, therefore, the
court incorrectly held that the retroactivity provision invaded the
province of the judiciary and was, as a result, unconstitutional.62
On rehearing, however, the Sanelli court's reapplication of the
separation of powers doctrine s highlighted that a statute which
changes the effect of a prior decision may be applied retroactively
where parties' rights have not been fully adjudicated.6 4 The court
appropriately recognized that a broad application of the separation
of powers doctrine serves to severely restrict the legislature's authority.65 The court, then, explicitly defined the separation of powers
58. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 229. For a list of Illinois cases emphasizing that a
prior decision must not be affected see supra note 49.
59. Sanelli, No. 57935, slip op. (Ill. April 27, 1984), rev'd, 483 N.E.2d 226
(1985).
60. Id. at 4-9. The court appears to have challenged the legislation by questioning whether the changes are declaratory of existing law and are therefore applicable
in relation to events which occurred before the effective date of the Act and whether
the terms and conditions specified in the act were in effect before the Act's effective
date. Id. This type of challenge is bound to find every retroactive statute that deals
with the subject matter of a past decision unconstitutional.
61. Id. It should be noted that the court never emphasized "finality." Sanelli,
No. 57935, slip op. (Ill. April 27, 1984), rev'd, 483 N.E.2d 226 (1985). The precedent
on which the court relied consisted of the following language: "annual a prior decision
of this court" from Roth v. Yackley, 77 Ill. 2d at 426, 396 N.E.2d at 522 (1979) (emphasis added) and "retroactively overruling a decision of a reviewing court" from In
re Marriage of Cohn, 77 Il. 2d at 197, 443 N.E.2d at 548 (1982) (emphasis added). Id.
62. Id. at 9.
63. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d 230-34.
64. See supra note 49.
65. If the court were to construe the separation of powers doctrine broadly, any
attempt of the legislature to correct an error in or a misapplication of preexisting law
to parties whose rights have yet to be fully adjudicated would be an invasion of the
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doctrine narrowly,"6 consistent with the scope of Illinois precedent,
as well as the decisions in other jurisdictions.6 7 The court applied
this traditional construction and accurately held that the Act's retroactivity provision did not invade the judicial province," because
the court could not find a specific legislative intent to reverse
Zarkin.6
Additionally, the Sanelli court's holding demonstrates the propriety of applying the separation of powers doctrine to similar disputes. Resolving the internal conflict over the scope of the separation of powers doctrine in favor of a narrow construction facilitates
the application of the doctrine to future controversies involving retroactive legislative enactments. Thus, the Sanelli court's definition
of the separation of powers doctrine as a determinant of retroactive
legislations' validity has significant precedential value. Moreover, a
narrow application of the separation of powers doctrine necessitates
that a distinction be drawn between a legislative attempt to reverse
a decision and an attempt to clarify that decision so as to avoid its
misapplication.
Although the court did not explicitly draw a line between a reversal and a clarification, its findings accurately reflect that this disjudiciary and, thus, unconstitutional.
66. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 229. Specifically, the question to be asked is whether
the retroactive legislation "changes the effect of a prior decision of a reviewing court
with respect to others whose circumstances are similar but whose rights have not
been finally decided." Id. Cf. United States v. Board of Education of Chicago, 588 F.
Supp. 132, vacated, 744 F.2d 1300 (1984) (final judgments cannot be retroactively
affected by changes made in the law subsequent to adjudication); W. WADE, supra
note 1, at § 36 (citing Cooley from COOLEY'S CONST. LIM. 113, 114) ("legislature cannot... reverse decisions which the courts, in the exercise of their undoubted authority, have made;" for this would not only be the exercise of the judicial power, but it
would be its exercise in the "most objectionable and offensive form, since the legislature would, in effect, sit as a court of review, to which parties might appeal when
dissatisfied with the rulings of the court.").
67. For an extensive list of Illinois cases applying a narrow construction of the
separation of powers doctrine, see supra note 49. See also Marine Power v. Washington State Human Rights Comm'n Hearing Tribunal, 39 Wash. App. 609, 694 P.2d 697
(1985). The Court of Appeals of Washington declared that a statutory amendment
limiting damages for humiliation and suffering in an employment discrimination dispute applied retroactively and was constitutional. Id. The court held that what the
legislature may not do is overrule by legislative enactment a prior authoritative Supreme Court opinion construing a statute. Id. In Schwarz-Kopf v. Sac County Bd. of
Supervisors, 341 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1983), the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a curative act extending the scope of a county's easement-granting powers did not offend
the constitutional separation of powers. Id. The court held that while the effect of a
court's prior decision was nullified, the legislature was not attempting to nullify the
decision itself, nor was it mandating to the judiciary how it should interpret the statute in question. Id.
68. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 234. The court also found that Sanelli's contract obligations or rights were not impaired, nor was the due process clause violated. Id. at
238-39.
69. Id. at 230-34.
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tinction is what separates constitutional retroactive legislation from
that which is unconstitutional. The Zarkin court held that land
trustees are subject to all fiduciary duties70 imposed in a traditional
trust relationship. 7 1 The Act provides that being a secured creditor
and land trustee at the same time did not constitute a breach of any

fiduciary duty.72 Logically, it does not follow that the legislature was

attempting to reverse Zarkin because, on the one hand, Zarkin established that land trustees have fiduciary duties and, on the other,

the Act defined a practice that did not constitute a breach of duty.
Rather, it is apparent that the act was passed in order to avoid the
misapplication of Zarkin to any controversy that might arise out of
similar circumstances. The legislature was simply clarifying the
scope of the term "fiduciary duty" as it applies to land trusts.
Because the retroactivity provision served to clarify rather than
nullify Zarkin, the Sanelli court was justified in holding that the
Act applies to Zarkin-type disputes where a lending institution is
concurrently land trustee and secured creditor.7 3 In particular, the
Act governed the Sanelli case because the Act was the law "in effect" when the court considered the dispute.74 Consequently, any
70. For a definition of a fiduciary relation see supra note 20.
71. Home Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. of Chicago v. Zarkin, 89 Ill. 2d at
236, 432 N.E.2d at 845 (1982). It should be noted that Zarkin was remanded to determine the reasonableness of the loan and subsequent assignment of the Zarkin's beneficial interest, not to reconsider the fiduciary duty issue. Therefore, Zarkin was a final
decision. Id.
72. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Illinois Bankers Ass'n at 15, Sanelli v. Glenview
State Bank, 483 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. 1985). The Act explicitly provides that
[t]he fact that a trustee of a land trust is or becomes a secured or unsecured
creditor of the land trust, the beneficiaries of the land trust, or a third party
whose debt to such creditor is guaranteed by a beneficiary of the land trust,
shall not be a breach of, and shall not be deemed evidence of a breach, of any
fiduciary duty owed by said trustee to the beneficiaries.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, § 83 (1983).
73. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 230-34.
74. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). Courts
must decide according to existing laws and when a holding cannot be affirmed without being in violation of an existing law, it must be set aside. Id. People ex rel. Bauer
v. Elmhurst-Villa Park-Lombard Water Comm'n, 20 Ill. 2d 139, 169 N.E.2d 350
(1960) (the general rule being that even though a judgment has been entered and a
cause is pending on appeal, the reviewing court must dispose of the case under the
law in force at the date the decision is rendered). Where the legislature has changed
the law pending an appeal, a reviewing court must dispose of a case under the law as
it then exists, and not under the law as it was when the trial court made its decision.
Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello, 18 Ill. 2d 306, 164 N.E.2d 47 (1960); Hughes v.
Ill. Public Aid Comm'n, 2 Ill. 2d 374, 118 N.E.2d 14 (1954) (decisions rendered applying the law as it stands at the time of the court's decision and not as it stands at time
the cause of action accrued or at the time of the trial court's decision); People ex rel.
Coen v. Henry, 301 Ill. 51, 133 N.E. 636 (1921) (the legislature changes the law, and
the court decides cases pending at the time of the change, disposing of them under
the law in force at the time of the judgment). See also, W. WADE, supra note 1, at
§ 38, Laws governing men in all their transactions are those which are in force at that
time, and not those which they believe may go into operation at a future day. Id.
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court considering Zarkin-type disputes on or after August 6, 1982
must apply the Act. Thus, the Sanelli court accurately found that
the retroactive application of the Act to the dispute between Sanelli
75
and the Bank was constitutional.
The Sanelli court's ruling is further justified because it promotes the underlying purpose of valid retroactive legislation. Courts
and other authorities have historically found retroactive legislation
unfair7 based upon people's expectations and their right to have notice of the laws governing their activities before they engage in
them. 7 7 These same authorities, however, recognize exceptions to
Until then, they are not laws. Id.
75. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 238-39.
76. Hochman maintains that the United State Supreme Court's attitude toward
retroactive legislation is that "it is impossible to reduce the potentially infinite variety of situations in which the problem of retroactivity can arise to a single common
denominator." Hochman, supra note 1, at 727. Precedent seems to indicate, however,
that one consideration of the Court is the extent to which parties have relied on preexisting law. Id. The reason this factor is given a great deal of weight is because the
interests that are balanced in making a determination of constitutionality are: "the
strength of the public interest it serves and the unfairness created by its retroactive
operation." Id. Reliance is a very accurate indicator of fairness. Id.
The opinions of courts, in general, are "replete with vapid verbalizations of standards which purport to govern decisions as to the legal permissibility of the retroactive application of new law." C. SANDS, supra note 1, at § 41.05. The propositions
flowing from these decisions, however, rarely reflect a conclusion regarding the validity of retroactive legislation. Id. Rather, this problem of constitutionality has ended
up being defined in a number of ways. Id. Thus, courts continue to search for a meaningful standard by which to review the validity of retroactive legislation. Id. "Justice
Holmes once remarked with reference to the problem of retroactivity that 'perhaps
the reasoning for the case has not always been as sound as the instinct which direct
the decisions' and suggested that the criteria which really governed decisions are the
'prevailing views of justice'." Id.
Smith maintains that "from the very beginning retroactive laws were under suspicion as instruments of oppression, within the spirit though not within the terms of
ex post facto prohibition." Smith (pt. I), supra note 2, at 234. For further discussion
see generally C. SANDS, supra note 1, at § 41.02; W. WADE, supra note 1, at § 3;
Greenblatt, supra note 1, at 540-50; Hochman, supra note 1, at 693-97; Smead, supra
note 1; Smith (pts. I & II), supra note 2.
77. See C. SANDS, supra note 1, at § 41.02, wherein the author observes:
It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that retroactive application
of new laws involves a high risk of being unfair. There is general consensus
among all people that notice or warning of the rules that are to be applied to
determine their affairs should be given in advance of the actions whose effects
are to be judged by them. The hackneyed maxim that everyone is held to know
the law, itself a principle of dubious wisdom, nevertheless presupposes that the
law is at least susceptible of being known. But this is not possible as to law
which has not yet been made.
Id.
Several commentators have addressed the same point: For example, Hochman,
supra note 1, at 692, asserts that "[p]erhaps the most fundamental reason why retroactive legislation is suspect stems from the principle that a person should be able to
plan his conduct with reasonable certainty of the legal consequences." Id. Whereas
Wade provides that "[iun all retroactive laws there must be an element of surprise, by
which the persons whose rights are affected are taken unaware. They are called upon
to act in a manner different from what they had been led by the previous state of the
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this general principle.7 8 One such exception occurs when a statute is
passed to cure a non-conformity between declarations of the content
of rights and relationships and people's expectations of those rights
and relationships.7 9 The purpose of this type of retroactive legislation is not only to regulate the rights and liabilities growing out of
past transactions, but also, to set clear standards to govern transactions in the future.8 0 Because the Sanelli court recognized the Act to
be an attempt to cure a potential non-confirmity apparent in
Zarkin, it was vindicated in holding that the retroactive application
of the Act was valid.
Traditionally, courts have given great deference to the legislature's intent."' The Sanelli court recognized the legislature's concern
over the potential problems the Zarkin decision posed. 2 Zarkin's
law to anticipate." W. WADE, supra note 1, at § 34. Scurlock maintains that retroactive legislation "destroys one's feeling of security. . . .Moreover, a retroactive statute
gives the person affected no opportunity to avoid the consequences by rearranging his
affairs." J. SCURLOCK, supra note 1, at 9.
78. See C. SANDS, supra note 1, at § 41.02. Sands provides several exceptions to
the general rule that retroactive laws are unfair: 1) it is not unfair for a law to retroactively confer benefits unless its enactment "arbitrarily deprives some people of the
opportunity to establish their eligibility" for such benefit; 2) it is not unfair to bring
legal rights "into conformity" with what people believed them to be; 3) it is not unfair to confirm official acts or amend charters; and 4) it is not unfair to impose legal
responsibilities where a choice as to those responsibilities would be impractical anyway. Id.; W. WADE, supra note 1, at § 38. "Exception to the strictness of [the general
rule which states that every reasonable doubt as to the intention of the legislature is
resolved against the retroactive operation of a statute] have been maintained in favor
of the retrospective operation of remedial statutes." Id. Statutes of Limitations are
also given retrospective effect so long as the litigation process has not yet begun. Id.
at 48.
79. C. SANDS, supra note 1, at § 41.02.
80. W. WADE, supra note 1, at § 1. Wade explicitly asserts that retroactive legislation "undertakes, not only to regulate rights and liabilities growing out of past
transactions, but sets up a standard by which they shall be governed in the future."
Id.
81. It is a long-standing principle that when a court is faced with interpreting a
statute, it has the duty to determine and effectuate the intent of the statute's drafters. Further, the best indication of the legislature's intent can be found in the ordinary meaning of the statute's language. See Sayles v. Thompson, 99 Ill. 2d 122, 457
N.E.2d 440 (1983); In re Criffen, 92 Ill. 2d 48, 440 N.E.2d 852 (1982); People v.
Brown, 92 Ill. 2d 248, 442 N.E.2d 136 (1982); Greenholdt v. Illinois Bell Telephone,
107 Ill. App. 3d 748 (1982). But see Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981),
wherein the court replaced the doctrine of contributory negligence with the doctrine
of comparative negligence where the legislature's intent was clearly to retain the contributory negligence rule. Id. This intent was apparent in the legislature's failure (the
related bill was introduced and voted upon, on six separate occasions) to enact comparative negligence legislation. Id. at 22, 421 N.E.2d at 895.
82. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Illinois Bankers Ass'n at 5, Sanelli v. Glenview
State Bank, 483 N.E.2d at 226. The legislature's concern for the problems raised was
evidenced in the fact that the Act which was introduced on March 30, 1982, as Senate
Bill 1488 passed the Senate 56-0 on May 6, and passed the House 162-0 on June 17.
Id. Further, both the Senate and the House recognized that Zarkin "caused considerable doubt and confusion as to the law of Illinois concerning the rights and duties of
financial institutions which serve in a dual capacity as land trustee and secured credi-
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mandate that land trustees are subject to the same fiduciary duties
imposed on all trustees 8 was sufficiently ambiguous8 4 to give rise to
a potential for misapplication. Over the course of the seven months
following Zarkin, Illinois courts decided a number of cases under

the Zarkin rationale.8 5 One court, in particular, misapplied Zarkin
and found a breach of a fiduciary duty where the Act, had it been
applied, would probably have barred the claim."' The Act clarifies
what a land trustee's fiduciary duties, as established in Zarkin, are
tor." 82nd Ill. Gen. Assem., Transcript of Senate Proceedings, May 6, 1982, at 39.
Accord 82nd Ill. Gen. Assem., Transcript of House Proceedings, June 17, 1982 at 910.
83. Home Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n of Chicago v. Zarkin, 89 II. 2d 232,
432 N.E.2d 841 (1982).
84. Id. Duty prohibits "dealing with the trust property for his own individual
benefit," also, nowhere does the Zarkin court address a "trustee-credit" lending institution with regard to a foreclosure and sale of trust property. Id. (emphasis added).
85. See In re Estate of Swiecki, 106 Ill. 2d 111, 477 N.E.2d 488 (1985). A bank
acting as a guardian of a minor's estate was required to account to the estate for
profits it realized through investments in its own accounts. Id. The court relied on
Zarkin to analogize the fiduciary duty of loyalty of a trustee to that of a guardian. Id.
In re Estate of Neisewander, 130 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 474 N.E.2d 1378 (1985), the distribution of an estate's assets, consisting of stock, to a beneficiary who was an executor
as well and the subsequent sale to the coexecutor was not a breach of the executor's
fiduciary duty. Id. The court interpreted Zarkin's dicta to mean that a fiduciary may
not purchase any encumbrance against his principal's property and that he is not
prohibited from having direct dealings with his beneficiaries so long as the dealings
are fair. Id. In David v. Russo, 119 Ill. App. 3d 290, 456 N.E.2d 342 (1983), the appellate court affirmed an order allowing reimbursement to constructive trustees from the
beneficiaries of the trust. Id. The court relied on Zarkin's holding that the trustee's
fiduciary duty is to serve the interest of the beneficiary with loyalty and, thus, he is
prohibited from dealing with the trust property for his individual benefit. Id. In re
Estate of Nuyen, 111 Ill. App. 3d 216, 443 N.E.2d 1099 (1982) distinguished an executor's fiduciary duties from a trustee's. Id. The court noted that even though the responsibilities might be similar, the executor's duties involve a duty to the creditors
for the estate as well as obtaining court approval for certain acts. In Ford City Bank
& Trust Co. v. Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 110 Il.App. 3d 123, 441 N.E.2d 1192
(1982), the beneficiary of a land trust was granted his motion to vacate the court's
earlier order which approved a sheriff's sale of the trust property to the sole bidder,
bank-trustee of the trust property. The appellate court interpreted Zarkin to mean
that such a sale constituted a breach of the bank's duty of loyalty to the beneficiary.
Id.
86. Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d at 123, 441 N.E.2d at 1192.
The court found that Zarkin provided that a bank-trustee's purchase for his own
account of property of his trust constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty.
Id. According to the Ford court, under Zarkin, a trustee "may not purchase trust
property in a private transaction, or at a public auction or foreclosure, or other judicial sale that was brought about by the trustee, or at a sale held on foreclosure of a
third party's lien." Id. at 126, 441 N.E.2d at 1195. Not only was the Ford court's
interpretation of Zarkin erroneous, it should have resolved the dispute between the
beneficiary and the bank applying the "Act" as it had been in effect since August of
1982. The result in Ford, even though it was reached through an erroneous application of Zarkin, is nevertheless justifiable because the bank was found not to have
fully disclosed the 1971 appraisal value of $500,000 to the beneficiaries prior to its
purchase of the trust property for $40,000. Id. Thus, the breach did not arise out of
the bank's purchase of the trust property at a public sale; rather, it arose out of the
bank's failure to comply with its fiduciary duty of disclosure.
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because it states what they are not.17 The language of the Act,"8 as
well as the legislature's unanimity in passing it,"' reflects an attempt
to cure the potential for future misapplications of the Zarkin holding. 0 Thus, precedent has been set for future controversies involving potential misapplication of the court's interpretation of law, be
it common or statutory.
If the Sanelli court would have allowed the Zarkin rule to be
misapplied, the most significant ramification would be its effect on
the banking industry.9 1 In a survey of the 185 banks involved in the
Sanelli case, 73 indicated that their institutions had over 5,500 land
trusts on which credit had been extended.92 At a minimum this
number would be five times as great if it included all interested
banks,93 and if the minimum loan was only $10,000, there would be
over $300 million at risk. 4 A misapplication of Zarkin would not
only have jeopardized the future of the banking industry, 95 but it
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 18, § 83 (1983).
The fact that a trustee of a land is or becomes a secured or unsecured creditor
of the land trust, the beneficiaries of the land trust, or a third party whose
debt to such creditor is guaranteed by a beneficiary of the land trust, shall not
be a breach of, and shall not be deemed evidence of a breach of, any fiduciary
duty owed by said trustee to the beneficiaries.
Id.
88. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 148, §§ 81-84 (1983). See supra note 29 for text of
statute. See also Chicago Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cacciatore, 25 Il. 2d 535,
547, 185 N.E.2d 670, 676 (1962) ("the law of this State and the decisions of reviewing
courts for more than 80 years have encouraged public reliance upon the real property
concepts exemplified in the land trust now before us."); 82nd Ill. Gen. Assem., Transcript of Senate Proceedings, May 6, 1982, at 39. (Senator Berman explained, "Senate
Bill 1488 recognizes and approves a long standing and widely used practice by Illinois
financial institutions to serve their customers by acting as both the trustee of land
trusts and also as a creditor with the security interest in that same trust").
89. See supra note 82.
90. Both the Senate and the House, when debating PA82-891, recognized that it
"will make clear" the law in Illinois with respect to a financial institution which is
concurrently land trustee and secured creditor, and an individual who is concurrently
beneficiary of a land trust and debtor. 82nd Ill. Gen. Assem., Transcript of Senate
Proceedings, May 6, 1982 at 40. Accord 82nd Ill. Gen. Assem., Transcript of House
Proceedings, June 17, 1982 at 10.
91. Various banks and trust companies throughout the state of Illinois claim
that the Zarkin decision "poses practical and legal problems affecting the proper and
sound operation of banks and trust companies throughout the state." Affidavit of the
Comm'r of Banks and Trust Co.'s for the State of Illinois at 1, Sanelli v. Glenview
State Bank, 483 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. 1985).
92. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Illinois Bankers Ass'n at 4, Sanelli v. Glenview
State Bank, 483 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. 1985).
93. Id. "All interested banks" would include all banks, especially Illinois banks,
that enter into land trust agreements and receive pledges for the beneficial interest in
the trust properties as security for a loan. Id.
94. Id.
95. See supra notes 85 and 86 and accompanying text. Affidavit of the Comm'r
of Banks and Trust Co.'s for the State of Illinois at 2, Sanelli v. Glenview State Bank,
483 N.E.2d 226 (Ill. 1985). The commissioner asserts that a misapplication of Zarkin
and any voiding of the Act would have a substantial impact on all banks which have
taken assignments of beneficial interests under land trusts established with those
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would have jeopardized the future of the entire economy as well.
The banking industry would have been forced to tighten its lending
policies which would have automatically resulted in a drastic decrease in the market's money supply. Consequently, the legislature,
in order to "foster and encourage" financing opportunities, unanimously passed the Act." Thus, finding the Act's retroactive application constitutional, the Sanelli court appropriately furthered the
legislature's intent.
Had the Act not been given retroactive effect, it is evident that
a debtor-beneficiary of a land trust agreement, relying solely on
Zarkin and a "traditional trustee-beneficiary relationship" could allege a breach of duty after defaulting on his loan and, thereby, effectively extinguish his debt. The Zarkin court surely did not intend
this result. Thus, the Sanelli court concurred with the legislature's
recognition of the need to correct the potential misapplication of a
judicial decision.9 7 Concluding that the retroactive application of the
Act is valid,9" the Sanelli court has set valuable precedent for the
resolution of future controversies where the protection of a substantial interest involves the retroactive application of the law.
The Sanelli court justifiably vindicated the legislature's authority to enact retroactive legislation because the Act did not invade
the judicial province, and because the court deferred to the legislature's intent to cure a potential misapplication of a judicial decision.
The court's decision has significant precedential value in that future
controversies involving the retroactive application of a law will be
resolved with a narrow application of the separation of powers doctrine. Retroactive legislation enacted to secure the public's expectabanks. Id. Such an impact poses the following problems: 1) it would complicate litigation pertaining to the loan transaction with issues that would not otherwise have been
raised, i.e., the validity of the loan; 2) it would prevent or at least deter the bank from
bidding for the property at a public sale because of the risks of liability for a breach
of a fiduciary duty of loyalty and the ability to transfer good marketable title to any
third party purchaser because the bank's purchase was arguably a breach of loyalty;
and 3) it would cause substantial hardship and expense as banks would attempt to
exchange existing land trusts with other banks in order to avoid being assignees of
beneficial interests under their own existing land trust agreements. Id. (The present
trustee would have to resign, a different trustee being appointed as successor. This
could only provide a solution in a limited number of cases because it would require
the consent of beneficiaries who would have an incentive to withhold such consent in
order to take further advantage of the Zarkin decision).
96. See supra note 82.
97. The legislature's intent to avoid a misapplication is evident in its interpretation of the Act. It recognized that the Act gives "reassurance" to both financial
institutions and their customers who have their property in a land trust that the law
has not been changed regarding their respective rights and duties, which were identified in Zarkin. 82nd Ill. Gen. Assem., Transcript of Senate Proceedings, May 6, 1982
at 40. Accord 82nd Ill. Gen. Assem., Transcript of House Proceedings, June 17, 1982
at 10.
98. Sanelli, 483 N.E.2d at 226.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 19:523

tions rather than to reverse a lower court's decision will meet the
requirements set out in Sanelli provided that a greater interest is
not impaired. The Sanelli court acknowledged this when it correctly
observed that it would not be fair to allow a beneficiary to assign his
beneficial interest to a trustee as security for a loan, obtain the loan,
and not have to repay the money simply because the trustee had
followed the beneficiary's directions. 9 The Sanelli court, therefore,
effectively saved the banking industry from disaster when it decided
that the retroactive application of the Act was constitutional.
Margaret Rosalie O'Brien

99.

Id. at 235.

